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1. Introduction
     The safety and reliability of sea harvester is 
important to enhance productivity, reduce risk to 
personnel onboard the vessel and damage to the 
environment. Design for safety of a sea harvester need to 
be constantly reviewed and incorporated to the vessel due 
to ever changing technology. New technology introduces 
hazards to marine and offshore vessels. Three broad 
categories of design, which are related to the design of 
various large marine and offshore products are: (i) 
original design: which involves producing an original 
solution for a system to carry out a new task; (ii) adaptive 
design: which involves adapting a known system to a 
changed task; (iii) variant design: which involves varying 
the size and/or arrangement of certain aspects of the 
chosen system, the function and the solution principle 
remaining the same [1][2]. Design for safety provides a 
systematic approach to the identification and control of 
high risk areas, and it would be beneficial to integrate it 
into the design process from the initial stages to reduce or 
eliminate major hazards [1]. However, due to the 
complexity of the safety assessment of large marine and 
offshore products and the lack of clear and complete 
guidance for a design for safety methodology, design for 
safety has not generally been specifically integrated into 
the design process for such products [1].  
This has led to questions about the safety and 
reliability of small vessels such as sea harvesters too, 
because of hazards such as machinery failure, flood, fire 
etc. that may be introduced while they are in operation. 
The International Maritime Organization and 
International Association of Classification Societies have 
also contributed immensely in ensuring the safety and 
reliability of small vessels are acceptable during their 
classification exercise on systems and subsystems that 
make up any marine and offshore vessel. However, 
attention of researchers have been drawn to them on 
whether there is preventive or mitigative measures in 
place on identified and unidentified hazards, incorporated 
as part of design for safety during the design process of 
the sea harvesters and how to maintain such measures. 
From the available literature search, design for safety has 
not been incorporated in sea harvester and such exercise 
will be applied in a sea harvester under construction. 
To address this challenge, a hybrid traditional safety 
methodology is developed. The hybrid traditional safety 
methodology is a combination of preliminary hazard 
analysis (PHA), risk matrix approach (RMA) and event 
tree analysis (ETA) method. The application of these 
techniques as a standalone has been proven in the works 
of [3-10]. [3] used an ETA method to model the 
consequences of various hazards of LNG carrier 
operations, while [4], adopted a PHA method in risk 
analysis of LNG carriers approaching the Panigaglia 
maritime terminal. [5] used RMA in combination with 
other advanced computing methods in risk analysis of 
LNG carrier operations. An ETA method was also used 
as an effective decision support tool for domino effect 
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prevention and mitigation [6]. In [7], an ETA method was 
utilized in flood protection on critical infrastructure as a 
result of climate change in Finland. [9] used PHA to 
facilitate risk analysis of railway systems. The author 
proved the method is viable in his work. The successfully 
application of PHA was also demonstrated in hazard 
analysis of hypersonic vehicles as evidenced in [8]. [10] 
utilized RMA in solving unexpected failures, the loss of 
production, and higher maintenance costs in 
manufacturing systems, while [11] used RMA in 
identification of risks involved in private capital 
participation in government project. Another usefulness 
of RMA is demonstrated in risk evaluation of natural gas 
pipelines [12]. Other applications of PHA, RMA and 
ETA method have been demonstrated in the works of 
[13-19]. Other successes of safety and risk management 
of engineering systems have been recorded in various 
publications [20, 21]. To facilitate the application of the 
hybrid traditional safety methodology, the research is 
structured as follows. In Section 1, the introduction is 
presented. Section 2 shows the methodology of the 
research. In Section 3, the case study is presented while 
Section 4 concludes the research. 
 
2. Methodology 
      This research targets to improve the operations and 
design of a seaweed harvester by reducing the risk using 
PHA and risk matrix approach. It also identifies systems 
that can improve the design for safety of seaweed 
harvester using an ETA method. The methodology of the 
research is illustrated in Figure 1. The information flow in 
Figure 1 starts from system identification/description. 
The next is design review/details, followed by 
identification of hazardous event. The next step is 
identification of hazardous event effect followed by 
classification of the risk of hazardous event using a risk 
matrix method. Once the risks have been classified and 
found not to be very low, then preventive measures will 
be identified, otherwise satisfactory result has been 
obtained. The next step is to identify systems that can 
mitigate the hazards consequences, followed by a check if 
the functionalities of the identified systems can mitigate 
consequence of the hazards. If positive, a satisfactory 
result has been obtained, otherwise go back to design 
review/details.  Data that will be used in this study, will 
be obtained through use of questionnaire during 
brainstorming exercise of three designers that designed 
the sea harvester under investigation.  
 
2.1  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
The PHA is a safety/risk analysis technique that uses 
inductive method. It is used to identify hazards/failures 
that can hinder proper system operations at the early 
design stage of product development. It is also use when 
the system has been fully developed as a precursor for 
further analysis of hazards/failures associated with the 
system operations. It facilitates incorporation of other 
safety analysis techniques in comprehensive risk/safety 
analysis process of marine and offshore systems. Its 
usefulness has been shown in works of [9][4][8]. 
According to [9], the steps of PHA are: 
 
• Identification of hazardous event. 
• Identification of hazardous event cause. 
• Identification of hazardous event effect. 
• Classification of risk. 
• Determination of preventive measure. 
 
                            System Definition 
Can the functionalities of identified systems 
mitigate consequence of the hazards? 
   Yes 
            Identify hazardous event effects 
Determine Preventive Measures 
   Are the risks very low? 
No 
  Start 
         Identify hazardous Event 
    End 
Yes 
      Identify systems that can mitigate the hazards consequences 
                 Design Review/Details  
      Classify the risk of hazardous event using risk matrix method 
No 
 
                                                  Fig. 1: A Flow Chart of Methodology of the Research 
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2.2 Risk Matrix 
       A RMA is one of the traditional safety/risk 
methods use in marine and offshore industry [22][5]. It 
is classified as a qualitative risk analysis methods as 
evidenced in the works of [10][11][12]. The 
mechanism of risk matrix is made up of definition of 
occurrence likelihood and consequence of hazards 
associated with the system under investigation. The 
definitions of occurrence likelihood and consequence 
of hazards are used to facilitate development of risk 
matrix table as evidenced in Tables 1-3. 
Mathematically, risk is defined in Equation 1 and 
converted to logarithmic scale in Equation 2, so as to 
facilitate calculation of risk scores in development of 
risk matrix table. 
 
Risk (R) = Occurrence likelihood of a Hazard   
Consequence of the Hazard                                       (1)  
 
Log (Risk) = Log (Occurrence likelihood of a Hazard) 
+ Log (Consequence of the Hazard)                          (2) 
 
         The logarithm expression of Equation 1, 
expressed in Equation 2, is used to develop the values 
in a risk matrix table developed in Table 3. In Table 3, 
remote, occasional, probable and frequent associated 
with scores of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively are used to 
describe occurrence likelihood of a hazard in the Row 
2. While the Column 1 of Table 3, accommodated the 
use of negligible, marginal, critical and catastrophic 
with their respective scores of 1, 2, 3 and 4 in 
description of consequence of a hazard. The areas of 
intersections of the rows and the columns of Table 3 
are the risks of the hazards with their associated scores 
(i.e 2 to 8), calculated using Equation 2. The 
description of the risk scores are shown in Table 4. 
 
                                                     
                                                           Table 1:  Description of Consequence of a Hazard [5] 
 
Linguistic term for consequence of 
a hazard 
             Description 
Negligible Less than minor system damage, less than minor injury/illness of 
personnel or negligible environmental damage. 
Marginal Minor system damage, minor injury/illness of personnel or minor 
environmental damage 
Critical Major system damage, severe injury/illness of personnel or major 
environmental damage 
Catastrophic System loss, death of personnel or severe environmental damage. 
 
                                              
 
                                                Table 2: Description of Occurrence Likelihood of a Hazard    
               
Linguistic term for occurrence 
likelihood  of a hazard 
                           Description 
Remote The hazard might occur once every 20 years of the whole sea harvester 
fleet. 
Occasional The hazard might occur every ten years for a sea harvester. 
Probable The hazard might occur once every year of the whole sea harvester fleet.  
Frequent The hazard might occur every year for a sea harvester. 
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                                                                        Table 3:  Risk Matrix Table [5]  
 
Consequence of a 
hazard 
Occurrence likelihood of a hazard 
1. Remote 2. Occasional 3. Probable 4. Frequent 
1. Negligible 2 3 4 5 
2. Marginal 3 4 5 6 
3. Critical 4 5 6 7 
4. Catastrophic 5 6 7 8 
 
 
                                Table 4: Description of Risk Levels and Risk Scores of the Risk Matrix Table [5] 
 
Risk levels Risk scores Description of risk Levels 
Very high 6, 7, 8 Vessel operations have to be prohibited until 
the risk is reduced to an acceptable level. 
High 5 Vessel operations can continue while risk 
reduction measures are being applied at an 
acceptable cost. 
Moderate 3, 4 Vessel operations continue while efforts are 
being made to reduce the risk, but the cost of 
prevention should be carefully measured and 
limited. Risk reduction methods should be 
implemented within a defined time period. 
Low 2 No actions are required on the vessel while 
in operation.  
 
 
2.3 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
       An ETA is a notable traditional safety/risk analysis 
tool used to develop and trace scenario and systems that 
can mitigate the consequence of a hazard (initiating 
event) under investigation in a logical manner. It uses 
graphical method to represent how the consequence of the 
hazard can be mitigated based on the functionality and 
non-functionality of the systems. The systems involved 
are logically related in terms of functionality and non-
functionality with respect to the consequence of the 
initiating event that need to be mitigated. ETA may be 
used qualitatively or quantitatively depending on the 
availability of data and expert judgement. It can be 
applied during the design or operations phase of marine 
and offshore assets. The graphical nature of ETA 
actualized via brainstorming session of various experts 
has revealed and identified systems and sub-systems that 
can contribute in improvement of safety of marine and 
offshore systems as evidenced in various publications [5] 
[18] [14] [15]. To estimate the probability of occurrence 
of the consequences of initiating event (hazard), the 
probabilities of the functionalities and non-functionalities 
of systems on the paths of the event tree diagram, leading 
to occurrence of consequence of the initiating event are 
multiplied. 
 
3. Case Study 
         The feasibility of the research methodology 
illustrated in Figure 1 is demonstrated in this section. A 
combination of PHA, risk matrix and ETA is 
systematically applied in hazardous event identification, 
risk estimation, consequence analysis and systems 
improvement of design for safety of a sea harvester. 
These traditional safety/risk methods will be prove to be 
useful tools in facilitation of improvement of design for 
safety of a sea harvester.   
 
3.1 Application of PHA to a Sea Harvester 
Operations 
         As evidenced in Section 2.1, PHA has Steps1-5. 
Steps 1-3 will be carried out in this section. Steps 4 and 5 
will be conducted in Sub-section 3.2 because RMA will 
be employed in addressing Step 4. In addition, Step 4 
needs to be revealed before addressing Step 5. Using 
expert judgment and brainstorming session, Table 5 is 
developed.  
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3.2 Application of Risk Matrix in Risk 
Estimation Exercise of a Sea Harvester 
Operations  
         The methodology of RMA has been detailed in Sub-
section 2.2. The methodology will be used to reveal the 
risk levels of fire, flooding, machinery failure and 
capsize. Information provided in Tables 1-4 will be 
employed in the risk estimation exercise (Step 4 of PHA). 
Using expert judgement and RMA, the consequence, 
occurrence likelihood and risk levels of fire, flooding, 
machinery failure, capsize and grounding during sea 
harvester operations are identified as shown in Table 6. 
As evidenced in Table 6, the risk levels of fire, flooding, 
machinery failure, capsize and grounding are classified as 
“very high”, thus the sea harvester operations has to be 
prohibited until the risk is reduced to an acceptable level 
by identification of preventive measures (Step 5 of PHA). 
The preventive measures are identified using 
brainstorming of the designers and the result is shown in 
Table 7. Though preventive measures have been 
identified, however consequences analysis of fire, 
flooding, machinery failure, capsize and grounding 
happening in sea harvester operations due to failure or 
lack of needed system need to be conducted using an 
ETA. Table 6 is developed using information provided in 
Tables 3-4, and designers’ judgement. 
 
 
              
            Table 5: Identification of hazardous event, cause and effect associated with Sea Harvester Operations   
 
 
                 Table 6: Estimation of Risk Levels of Fire, Flooding, Machinery Failure, Capsize and Grounding 
 
Identification of a 
hazardous event 
Consequence of a hazardous event Occurrence likelihood 
of a hazardous event 
Risk Level 
Fire 
 
Catastrophic Occasional Very high 
Flooding Critical Probable Very high 
Machinery failure Critical Frequent Very high 
 Capsize  
 
Catastrophic Occasional Very high 
 
Step 1: Identification 
of hazardous event  
Step 2: Identification of hazardous event 
cause  
Step 3: Identification of hazardous event effect 
Fire 
 
1. Fuel spillage. 
2. Faulty electrical component 
1. System loss. 
2. Injuries/death. 
3. Environmental damage.  
 
Flooding 
 
1. Crack in the hull 
 
   
  1. System loss. 
  2. Injuries/death. 
  3. Environmental damage. 
 
Machinery failure 1. Design error 
2. Installation error 
3. Lack of maintenance 
4. Lubricating oil problems 
5. Turbocharger problems 
6. Alignment problems 
 
1. Downtime. 
2. Low production output. 
Capsize  
 
1. Loss of stability. 
2. Flooding 
3. Over loading. 
 
 1. System loss. 
 2. Injuries/death. 
 3. Environmental damage. 
Grounding 1. Design error. 
2. Over loading. 
1.  Environmental damage. 
2.  System loss. 
3.  Injuries/death. 
4.  Downtime. 
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3.3 Application of ETA in Consequence 
Analysis and Improvement of Design for 
Safety of a Sea Harvester  
          A consequence analysis of functionality and non-
functionality of systems logically linked together with 
respect to safety and reliability of a sea harvester and 
mitigation of occurrence of fire, flooding, machinery 
failure, capsize and grounding need to be revealed using 
an ETA. The methodology of ETA has been described in 
Sub-section 2.3. The graphical feature of ETA will be 
used quantitatively and qualitatively to analyze each 
initiating event. In this study, the initiating events are fire, 
flooding, machinery failure and capsize. The ETA 
diagrams of fire, flooding, machinery failure, capsize and 
grounding in a sea harvester are illustrated in Figures 2-5 
respectively. Probabilities of occurrence and functionality 
of sequence of events are assigned in Figures 2-5 using 
expert judgment. 
 
 
 
              Table 7: Preventive Measures for Fire, Flooding, Machinery Failure, Capsize and Grounding 
 
 
3.3.1. Event Tree for Fire in a Sea Harvester  
         In Figure 2, it has been revealed that the 
probabilities of occurrence of consequences such as 
negligible damage, minor damage, limited damage, major 
damage, injuries/death in a sea harvester are 0.8, 0.098, 
0.042, 0.042 and 0.018 respectively. Each of the 
probabilities of occurrence is calculated by multiplication 
of probabilities associated with the line of sequence of 
events from initiating event to consequence region. 
Therefore, the probabilities of occurrence of   
consequences are calculated as follows: 
Negligible damage in a Sea Harvester = 0.8 
 
Minor damage in a Sea Harvester = 0.2 x 0.7 x 0.7 = 
0.098 
 
Limited damage in a Sea Harvester = 0.2 x 0.7 x 0.3 = 
0.042 
 
Major damage in a Sea Harvester = 0.2 x 0.3 x 0.7 = 
0.042 
 
Injuries/death in a Sea Harvester = 0.2 x 0.3 x0.3 = 0.018 
 
 
Identification of a hazardous event Preventive Measure 
 
 
Fire 
 
1. Provision of temperature sensors. 
2. Provision for fire alarm system. 
3. Provision of fire extinguishers. 
4. Provision of water sprinkler systems.  
 
Flooding 1. Watch keeping 
2. Good maintenance culture 
Machinery failure 1. Redundancy of outboard engine 
2. Good maintenance culture 
 
Capsize  
 
1. Use of stabilizers. 
2. Provision of life jackets. 
3. Provision of dead man key to automatically turn off the outboard engine 
incase of capsize. 
 
Grounding  1. Use of echo sounder. 
2. Watch keeping.  
3. Good maintenance culture 
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Negligible Damage 
Fire 
   Initiating event 
Minor Damage 
Fire Spread 
Quickly  
Sprinkler 
system fails 
worksorkscti
Alarm system fails  Consequence 
 Limited damage 
 Major Damage 
 Injuries/Death 
 Yes (0.3) 
 Yes (0.3) 
 Yes (0.2) 
 No (0.8) 
 Probability 
 No (0.7) 
 No (0.7) 
 Yes (0.3) 
No (0.7) 
 0.8 
0.098 
 
 0.042 
 0.042 
 0.018 
 
                                                   Fig. 2: Event Tree for Fire in Sea Harvester 
 
As can be evidenced from the probabilities of occurrence 
of negligible damage in a sea harvester, the design for 
safety of the aforementioned vessel has been improved 
and is acceptable. Negligible damage, minor damage, 
limited damage, major damage, injuries/death in a sea 
harvester are 0.8, 0.098, 0.042, 0.042 and 0.018 
respectively. 
 
3.3.2. Event Tree for Flood in a Sea 
Harvester  
        The event tree of flood in sea harvester is illustrated 
in Figure 3. In a similar way to Sub-section 3.3.1, the 
probabilities of occurrence of consequences such as 
negligible damage, minor damage, limited damage, major 
damage, injuries/death are calculated as 0.75, 0.18, 0.045, 
0.02 and 0.005 respectively. The design for safety of a 
sea harvester with respect to flood is acceptable because 
the probabilities of occurrence of negligible damage and 
injuries/death are 0.75 and 0.005 respectively. It means 
that the probability/chance of catastrophic consequence of 
flood in a sea harvester happening is very low and various 
systems/sequences of events that can mitigate the 
consequence of flood have been  identified/installed.  
 
 
Negligible Damage 
Flood 
   Initiating event 
Minor Damage 
Water spread 
quickly  
Drainer 
system fails 
Alarm system fails  Consequence 
 Limited damage 
 Major Damage 
 Injuries/Death 
 Yes (0.2) 
 Yes (0.1) 
 Yes (0.25) 
 No (0.75) 
 Probability 
 No (0.9) 
 No (0.8) 
 Yes (0.2) 
No (0.8) 
 0-75 
0-18 
 
 0.045 
 0.02 
 0.005 
 
                                                Fig. 3: Event Tree for Flood in Sea Harvester 
 
 
3.3.3. Event Tree for Machinery Failure in a 
Sea Harvester  
        The Figure 4 is an event tree of machinery failure in 
a sea harvester. In Figure 4, the probabilities of 
occurrence of consequences such as negligible damage, 
minor damage, limited damage, major damage and 
injuries/death are calculated as 0.9, 0.064, 0.016, 0.016 
and 0.004 respectively. The design for safety of sea 
harvester with respect to machinery failure is acceptable 
because of the values of probabilities of occurrence of 
negligible damage, minor damage, limited damage, major 
damage and injuries/death. 
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Negligible Damage 
Machinery 
Failure 
   Initiating event 
Minor Damage 
Failure spread 
quickly  
Cooling 
system fails 
Alarm system fails  Consequence 
 Limited damage 
 Major Damage 
 Injuries/Death 
 Yes (0.2) 
 Yes (0.2) 
 Yes (0.1 
 No (0.9) 
 Probability 
 No (0.8) 
 No (0.8) 
 Yes (0.2) 
No (0.8) 
 0-9 
0-064 
 
 0.016 
 0.016 
 0.004 
 
                                   Fig. 4: Event Tree for Machinery Failure in Sea Harvester 
 
3.3.4. Event Tree for Capsize in a Sea  
Harvester  
       The ETA of capsize of sea harvester is developed and 
illustrated in Figure 5. Adopting same approach in 
Subsection 3.3.1, the probabilities of occurrence of 
consequences such as no damage or capsize, major 
damage and no loss of life (when there is life jacket and 
dead man key on engine didn’t fail), major damage and 
injuries/death (when there is no life jacket and dead man 
key on engine didn’t fail), major damage and no loss of 
life (when there is life jacket and dead man key on engine 
failed) and major damage and injuries/death (when there 
is no life jacket and dead man key on engine failed) as a 
result of the capsize of sea harvester are calculated as 0.8, 
0.1399, 0.0001, 0.0599 and 0.0001 respectively as 
evidenced in Figure 5. In view of the values of the 
probabilities of the consequences, the design for safety of 
a sea harvester with respect to capsize has been improved 
and is acceptable. 
 
No damage or 
capsize 
Capsize 
   Initiating event 
Major damage and no 
loss of life 
Stabilizer 
system fails  
Dead man key 
on engine fails. 
No life jacket in sea harvester  Consequence 
Major damage and 
Injuries/death 
Major damage and no 
loss of life 
Major damage and 
Injuries/death 
 Yes (0.001) 
 Yes (0.3) 
 Yes (0.2) 
 No (0.8) 
 Probability 
 No (0.7) 
 No (0.999) 
 Yes (0.001) 
No (0.999) 
 0.8 
0.1399 
 
 0.0001 
 0.0599 
 0.0001 
 
                                                      Fig. 5: Event Tree for Capsize of a Sea Harvester 
 
 
3.3.5. Event Tree for Grounding in a Sea 
Harvester  
The ETA of grounding of sea harvester is shown in 
Figure 6. Utilizing same approach in Subsection 3.3.1, the 
probabilities of occurrence of no damage or grounding, 
major damage and no loss of life (when navigational 
system failed, but power and alarm systems didn’t fail), 
major damage and injuries/death (when navigational 
system failed, power system didn’t fail, but alarm system 
failed), major damage and no loss of life (when 
navigational system failed, power system  failed, but 
alarm system didn’t fail) and major damage and 
injuries/death (when navigational, power and alarm 
systems failed) are estimated as 0.9, 0.0899, 0.0001, 
0.00999 and 0.00001 respectively as shown in Figure 6. 
In view of the values of the probabilities of the 
consequences, the design for safety of a sea harvester 
with respect to grounding has been improved and is 
acceptable. 
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No damage or grounding 
Grounding 
Initiating  
event Major damage and no loss of life 
Navigational 
system fails  
Power system 
fails 
Alarm system fails            Consequence 
Major damage and Injuries/death 
damage and no loss of life 
Major damage and no loss of life 
Major damage and Injuries/death 
 Yes (0.001) 
Yes (0.1) 
 Yes (0.1) 
 No (0.9) 
 Probability 
No (0.9) 
No (0.999) 
Yes (0.001) 
No (0.999) 
  0.9 
0.0899 
 0.0001 
 0.00999 
 0.00001 
 
                                                  Fig. 6: Event Tree for Grounding of a Sea Harvester 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Improvement of design for safety of seaweed harvester 
has been carried out using a combination of PHA, risk 
matrix and ETA methods. Hazardous events such as fire, 
flooding, machinery failure, capsize and grounding were 
identified as the ones that pose to be threats to operations 
of seaweed harvester using PHA step by step procedures. 
RMA was used to facilitate completion of application of 
PHA method. RMA was employed in determination of 
risk levels of fire, flood, machinery failure and capsize. 
The mechanism of RMA and expert judgment revealed 
that fire, flooding, machinery failure, capsize and 
grounding risks belong to very high-risk 
level/region/category. In view of this risk levels, 
preventive measures for fire, flooding, machinery failure, 
capsize and grounding were identified, which was the 
final step of PHA. The ETA approach was utilized in 
identification of systems that can be used to mitigate the 
consequences of fire, flooding, machinery failure, capsize 
and grounding which depended on the systems’ 
functionality and non-functionality. 
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